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New Europeans on the Move:
A preliminary review of the
onward migration of refugees
within the European Union

Anna Lindley & Nicholas Van Hear

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Abstract

The onward movement of new citizens of refugee backgrounds within the European Union is an apparently growing pattern in European mobility which has largely been overlooked. This paper reviews the still limited evidence relating to these movements, focusing on the relocation of Somali and Tamil Sri Lankan Europeans from continental Europe to the UK, and discusses the conceptual and practical issues raised by this mobility, outlining an agenda for future research.

Key words

Refugees, European Union, citizenship, secondary migration

Authors

Anna Lindley, ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. anna.lindley@compas.ox.ac.uk
Nicholas Van Hear, Acting Director, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. nicholas.vanhear@compas.ox.ac.uk
Introduction

The onward movement of displaced people has attracted considerable research and policy attention in recent years. Faced with difficult conditions in countries of first asylum, displaced people sometimes move onward to more distant countries through refugee resettlement programmes or family reunion provisions. People also move onwards from countries of first asylum through independently-made arrangements - often using irregular methods to reach their destination to overcome attempts by policy-makers to contain refugees in their region of origin. There is considerable policy interest in these types of ‘secondary movement’, both on the part of richer states concerned to limit asylum claims, and organisations like UNHCR, concerned to ensure that countries of first asylum offer adequate protection to refugees (UNHCR 2006).

This paper focuses on a third type of onward movement, hitherto largely overlooked: the onward movement of new citizens of refugee background within the European Union. In 1995–2004, 3.2 million people claimed asylum in the EU and around 1.3 million were granted refugee or some other form of humanitarian or temporary protection. Nearly half a million were recognised as Convention status refugees (UNHCR 2006: 226). Many Convention refugees, and also some people who were given other forms of protection, subsequently gained citizenship of their host state. These new citizens have the right to move freely within the EU. Preliminary research suggests that among certain groups of new citizens there may be a significant emerging trend towards relocation within the EU. This movement of new citizens is entirely legal - indeed, the mobility of workers within the EU is generally promoted. Yet it forms a new strand in EU mobility that is as yet poorly understood. It represents an aspect of refugee (re)settlement in the EU that raises questions about refugee and immigrant integration in national and supranational contexts. These relocations also have implications for transnational relations and diaspora ‘re-grouping’.

This paper reviews and discusses the still limited evidence relating to these movements, and explores the issues that they raise. The paper first reviews the evidence on the patterns and geography of EU mobility. Second, it outlines the legal and policy framework. Third, building on
recent research with Somalis and Sri Lankan Tamils in the UK, we explore some preliminary insights into the motivations and experiences of the people involved. Fourth, we explore the conceptual and practical issues raised by this mobility and outline an agenda for future research.

**The geography of new citizens’ onward migration: initial evidence**

According to the European Commission, less than 2 per cent of EU citizens live in another member state, and less than 20 per cent of foreign-born workers in the EU15 countries are citizens of another EU country (EC 2006). The countries with the highest proportions of labour force from another EU state are Ireland (5.3 per cent), Belgium (4.6 per cent), Austria (3.3 per cent), Germany (2.5 per cent), and the UK (2.2 per cent). Among recently mobileii EU-15 citizens of working age, the top destinations are the UK (27 per cent), Germany (20 per cent), Spain (14 per cent), and France (11 per cent). Only around 3 per cent of EU citizens expect to move to another EU Member State in the next five years, with the highest mobility potentials in Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Finland and France.

The movement of new citizens of refugee background is a small part of this EU mobility. So far, the main sources of information on this mobility consist of qualitative research with specific national groups; administrative data from local authorities, schools and local services; and local media and community workers. These sources point to several patterns, although information on the scale of these movements is as yet limited. It is clear that significant numbers of Somali Europeans have relocated, mainly Danish, Dutch, Finnish, Italian and Norwegian citizens of Somali origin relocating to the UK, since the end of the 1990s.iii It is also clear that many Sri Lankan Tamil Europeans have relocated within the EEA from about the same time: mainly Dutch, French, German, and Scandinavian citizens of Sri Lankan Tamil origin relocating to the UK.iv Beyond this there is some evidence to suggest some relocation among Sudanese Europeans, mainly Dutch, Finnish, German and Norwegian citizens of Sudanese origin.
moving to other countries, particularly the UK.\textsuperscript{v} There is also anecdotal evidence of Dutch nationals of Iraqi origin moving to the UK.\textsuperscript{vi} Some relocation has also been noted among Afghan, Congolese and Ivorian Europeans, moving mainly from France and Germany to the UK.\textsuperscript{vii} There may be other patterns not yet identified – the UK may not be the only destination country.

More research is needed to mine existing macro-level data sources that may shed light on the scale of the onward movement of these new citizens, including administrative data (e.g. border clearance data, and municipality records), passenger surveys, census data, and labour force and other national-level surveys. A key challenge with such sources is that there is often relatively limited disaggregated information on the migration of EU nationals. Moreover, some sources only record country of birth, and others only nationality: for example, the UK census collects information on country of birth but not nationality. It can be difficult to obtain information from standard sources on say, Iraqi-born Dutch nationals living in the UK.

**Legal and policy frameworks**

Freedom of movement is a long-standing aspect and an important symbol of European integration. The rationale is that it:

...will contribute to the formation of a stronger European identity and a deeper European integration... From an economic perspective, the free movement of labour is seen as a way of promoting labour market efficiency by improving the matching of the available labour supply to the demand from employers...Greater labour force mobility, both between jobs (job mobility) and within and between countries (geographic mobility) can help the European economy and labour force to adapt to changing conditions more smoothly and efficiently, as well as respond to change in the competitive global economy... (EC 2006: 207).

However, despite the removal of barriers to movement within the EU and the fact that mobility is widely regarded as a positive,
...actual mobility levels within Europe have remained comparatively low... with less than 2% of all EU citizens living in another EU Member State. This low overall mobility tends to indicate the absence of a genuine “mobility culture” for workers in the EU. (EC 2006: 207, see also Geddes 2006).

In this context, it is interesting that particular groups of new citizens may be manifesting a propensity for EU mobility possibly greater than those of the general EU population.

What exactly are the legal provisions underpinning EU mobility? Under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, citizens of member states can freely enter and reside in other member states. They may take up employment and should not be discriminated against by employers because of their nationality in terms of conditions of employment, pay or working conditions (EC 2006; Guild 2004). Thus, new citizens of refugee background have the freedom to move, reside and work in any part of the EU. No other region in the world has allowed such a high level of mobility (Van Selm 2000).

In recent years, various policy initiatives have aimed to promote mobility within the EU. Key initiatives include: the Action Plan on Skills and Mobility 2002; the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Employment (2005-2008); the Action Programme in the field of Lifelong Learning (2007-2013); and the European Year of Workers’ Mobility 2006. Efforts to facilitate mobility include attempts to improve the transferability and recognition of qualifications, the introduction of a European health insurance card, and better co-ordination of social security schemes (EC 2006).

A key concern is the issue of whether EU citizens who have exercised their right to move and reside have a right to access social benefits. There are three main principles in community social security legislation: first, nationals of other Member States may not be discriminated against in comparison with the host state’s own nationals; second, individuals may only be affiliated to one social security system at a time; and third, individuals may export their benefits to other Member States (Guild 2004). The goal has been not to harmonise the diverse welfare state models in the EU, but rather to co-ordinate across welfare
states to ensure the portability of entitlements for citizens moving from one member state to another (Geddes 2006). There is much discussion on EU citizens’ access to social security benefits and the jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice is not wholly clear.

In the UK, for example, in order to access certain important means-tested benefits (including Council Tax Benefit, Housing Benefit, Income Support and income-based Jobseeker's Allowance), EU citizens must prove that they are habitually resident in the UK. In making decisions about who is habitually resident, decision-makers consider, amongst other factors, whether the person has worked in the UK, why the person came to the country, how they have been supporting themselves, and how long they intend to remain in the UK. However there is on-going discussion about whether these arrangements are consistent with principles of non-discrimination and equality in European Law (EC 2005; Marsh 2002; Dysch 2006).

There are also provisions for EU citizens to access education and health services. For example, in the UK schools and Local Education Authorities are obliged to offer school places to all children of statutory school age - regardless of their rights of residence. According to the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), the largest group of EU nationals entering British schools are Portuguese, many of whose parents work in hotel, catering and food-processing industries, often on a seasonal basis meaning that the families may move many times. But the QCA also highlights ‘significant numbers’ of children whose families immigrated to and gained citizenship or residency in other EU states before settling in the UK, including Somalis from the Netherlands and Sweden, Sri Lankan Tamils in various EEA countries, and Nigerians and Ghanaians from Germany. A recent study of asylum-seekers in British schools, noted that a number of schools have admitted newly arrived pupils whose families had been granted refugee status elsewhere in the EU. ‘In an extreme case, one primary school had admitted in a two-year period 300 such pupils. The school managed with difficulty to integrate the pupils successfully, but not without drawing significantly upon its budget reserve’ (OFSTED 2003: 10).
In contexts where there is significant inward movement of EU nationals, a lack of accurate numbers can make it harder for local authorities to predict and plan for the resulting changes in the labour and housing markets and demand for education and other public services. This has been demonstrated with the movement to the UK of both Accession state nationals and nationals of various EU countries of Somali backgrounds (Aston 2002; Audit Commission 2007; Marsh 2002; Dysch 2006; White 2004).

Having indicated the limited evidence on the movement of new citizens of refugee background within the EU, and outlined the policy and legal framework that governs their movement, we now turn to two cases of such movement - Somalis and Sri Lankan Tamils.

The onward movement of Somali Europeans to the UK: preliminary insights

With the outbreak of civil war in north-west Somalia in the late 1980s, there was large-scale internal and regional displacement, with some people travelling further afield to Europe. Many northern Somali refugees joined relatives resident in the UK who had settled there earlier as a result of colonial ties: as students, Merchant Navy seamen or their dependents. As the civil war spread and the state collapsed in 1991, there was further mass displacement to neighbouring countries, with a sub-set of refugees reaching various European countries to claim asylum. There was also some relocation of people who worked in the Gulf states to Europe, when their work permits or other status expired but they were unable to return to Somalia. Small numbers also arrived through resettlement programmes. The situation in the Somali regions remains uncertain, with the southern Somali regions still very unstable. Displacement and emigration continues.

Since the late 1990s, a further migration pattern has emerged: the movement of citizens of Somali origin from mainland Europe - particularly Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden - to the UK. Some of the newcomers lived ten or more years in mainland Europe.
before moving to the UK. Appendix 1 summarises the patchy information available on the numbers of people involved. It would seem that over 20,000 EU citizens born in Somalia or whose parents were born in Somalia have relocated to the UK since the late 1990s. Some EU citizens went to live in places where there was already an established community; Bristol, the East End of London, Liverpool and Sheffield. But EU citizens often also settled in ‘new’ locations, particularly in the Midlands (Momatrade 2004). It is possible to detect particular geographic trends: for example, some say that people from the Netherlands tend to move to Leicester, while people from Scandinavia tended to move to Birmingham. This movement and the reasons behind it are a popular subject of discussion among Somali Europeans. Preliminary insights gained during a research project in 2004-2006 focusing on Somali displacement and remittance dynamics (Lindley 2006; 2007) suggests that the push and pull factors for this onward movement fall into three broad categories: economic opportunities, education and social environment.

First, people often reported that in mainland Europe employment opportunities were more limited, with high unemployment rates among people born in Somalia in Netherlands and Scandinavia – although rates are also high in the UK (Bang Nielson 2004; GLA 2005). People suggested that in their country of citizenship even jobs not seen as highly skilled require good language skills and qualifications. A popular example given was Somali European men working as London bus drivers:

In the Netherlands, bus driver is more professional than here. Bus drivers... have to speak Dutch perfectly, he should know the area he’s working [in], he should know health and safety. Very qualified... Here, if I pass the driving licence today, after six months I can drive a bus easily... I met last week one Somali and he can’t speak even English and he’s a bus driver. How is he communicating with the people?! And he told me he is working seven days and £2,300 a month at least he gets. And he moved from the Netherlands... he said, 'I wasted my time with the Netherlands... I was in the Netherlands 15 years, I never worked...' He can save £1,000 a month, that’s £12,000 a year. That’s a lot of money in Somalia! Maybe two houses!

Revealingly, the wish to improve one’s economic situation was often linked, as in this quotation, not only to aspirations for oneself and one’s
household, but also to transnational aspirations: supporting relatives and maintaining links in Somalia. Another well-worn path for newcomers unable to find jobs is business, but many Somali people in the Netherlands, for example, found that this was difficult, requiring qualifications and daunting official paperwork, and some had attempted and failed. They were impressed with the comparative ease of opening a business or finding a job in the UK (see also Hansen 2006). Reportedly there has been a rapid growth in Somali businesses in Leicester with 36 established in the two years to 2004 (White 2004)

Education was the second area where there were push and pull factors encouraging migration from mainland Europe to the UK. The earlier division of students into vocational and academic education in some countries was seen to disadvantage students of Somali origin: parents feared that their children’s disrupted education and language skills would hold them back, that teachers underestimate these students’ abilities and presume that they will not go on to university. Higher education often appeared more open in the UK, for children but also for their parents as mature students (although the fees were generally higher). Turning to language, the use of English as a common means of international communication represented an incentive, and previous knowledge of English in some cases was a facilitating factor.

Third, there is the social environment. There is an element of family and social regrouping: the presence of relatives and friends in the UK – some of whom sought asylum there, others of whom made the move from mainland Europe earlier on – represented a strong incentive. This meant that women might share childcare responsibilities more easily. The larger Somali community in the UK also appears to act as a pull. For example, people who claimed asylum in the Netherlands during most of the 1990s were dispersed to rural areas, living in close-knit white communities, where they felt in danger of losing their culture and control of their children (see also Brons and Schaap 2002). xiii In contrast, people seemed to feel that it would be possible to live alongside other people of Somali origin and retain their cultural identity by making Leicester and other UK cities their home, in some ways seeking out an enclave to retain their identity (see also Bang Nielsen 2004). People often emphasised hostile
political attitudes, adverse public opinion, and negative media coverage regarding immigrants and Muslims in their country of citizenship, citing particular controversies relating to anti-immigration politics and anti-Islamic news coverage in the Netherlands, debates in Denmark on the circumcision of Somali girls, and the controversy over the wearing of veils in French schools. People commented on the greater availability of Koranic schools, Mosques, and the legality of *qat* (a leaf chewed in the Horn of Africa that is illegal in some Scandinavian countries) in the UK. In sum, although racism and discrimination persists in the UK, Somali Europeans seemed to feel that the relative diversity of UK cities made it easier to get on with life.

The economic, educational and environmental factors that propel this secondary migration go far beyond the supposed primordial nomadic restlessness of Somali people often invoked in casual commentaries. Moreover, these preliminary insights tend to refute the notion that people move in order to gain better security state benefits, as is sometimes suggested. On the contrary, state benefits in the UK may not be immediately accessible and tend to be less than in the Netherlands or Scandinavia. Many Somali EU citizens deliberately trade in more generous social provision elsewhere in northern Europe for what they see as better economic opportunities in the UK - they see their move to the UK as a move *into* economic activity rather than out of it. Some suggest that Somali Europeans moved to the Midlands because accommodation was much cheaper there. Many people do detailed research, sending a family member to visit and find a job and housing, and consulting among contacts about rent, job or business opportunities and schools.

It is important to emphasise that these motivations emerged mainly from discussions with people who did move. Those who *do not* move are likely to have more positive views of the situation in their country of citizenship. It is also important to point out that these are *perceptions* that prompt this recent and on-going migration rather than actual experiences of settlement in the UK, which can hold surprises. In some cases, expectations were not borne out, or unanticipated disadvantages emerged. Some people report that they have not got to know many white British people as they live in areas with a large proportion of ethnic
minorities, and feel limited to the Somali community in terms of social contact. Others comment on the high cost of renting property, lower quality of social services (particularly health services), lack of public childcare provision, perceived higher crime rates in the UK, and the more run-down and dirty public spaces in the city where they live (see also Moret and Van Eck 2005; Bang Nielson 2004). Experiences of British secondary schools sometimes also disappoint: the disruption of changing school system takes a toll, and in the inner city areas where Somali Europeans often settle their children attend schools where there are a lot of problems stemming from general social disadvantage (see also Al-Sharmani 2006). Some young people born or brought up in the Netherlands miss friends, do not feel at home in the UK and want to return to the Netherlands (Van den Reek and Hussain 2003).

It seems that the UK is the most popular destination among Somali Europeans. For Diesow (2004), this is because it represents at once a gishiin, or transiting port (a place to stop until it is safe to return home), a dhul fursad leh, or land of opportunities (in terms of employment, business and education) and a kulmiye, or meeting point (for scattered family members and friends who initially sought asylum wherever possible and are now able to meet up again). However, it should be noted that beyond onward movement from other EU countries to the UK, movement has also been noted on a smaller scale between Germany and the Netherlands as part of family regrouping (Moret et al. 2005) and there are also aspirations among some Somali Europeans to move to North America. Some Somali people in Switzerland moved on to EU states and North America (Moret et al. 2005).

The onward movement of Sri Lankan Tamil Europeans to the UK: preliminary insights
Like Somalia, Sri Lanka has suffered protracted civil war and large scale displacement within and outside the country. The conflict since the early 1980s in Sri Lanka has generated substantial movements of asylum seekers to Europe and other destinations, notably Canada. The UK
accommodates the largest and longest settled Tamil population in Europe, while France, Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries have also been important destinations (Van Hear 2004). By 2002, it was estimated that 110,000 Sri Lankans lived in the UK, including 60,000 refugees (Zunzer 2004). Estimates by community leaders suggest a higher figure of 150,000 of Sri Lankan Tamil origin in the UK, a figure which probably includes those born in the UK of Tamil parents.

The Tamils in the UK have arrived in a number of different waves (Daniel and Thangaraj 1995; Van Hear 2004). Professionals arrived from around independence in the late 1940s. Finding their paths to higher education blocked by discrimination, increasing numbers of Tamil students made their way to the UK to pursue their studies from the 1960s. From the later 1980s, increasing numbers of asylum seekers fleeing the escalating conflict sought safety in the UK, their numbers increasing substantially in the 1990s. Family reunion migration was associated with each of these waves of primary migration. Tamil migration to countries of continental Europe tended to gather momentum later, partly precipitated by increasing restrictions introduced in the mid 1980s by the British government explicitly to curtail Tamil asylum migration to Britain (Pirouet 2001). While there was some professional and student migration, most Tamil migration to continental Europe was of asylum seekers from the later 1980s and particularly in the 1990s.

As with the Somali case, since around 2000 a substantial movement of Tamils to the UK has begun from continental Europe, as Tamils who arrived as asylum seekers in the late 1980s and 1990s finally became recognised as refugees and eventually acquired citizenship of EU member states, enabling them to move within the EU. Many have lived and formed families in continental European states for a decade or more, while waiting for their cases to work through. Asylum applications by Tamils in the UK have dwindled since the 2002 cease-fire in Sri Lanka and the wider curtailment and deterrence measures directed at asylum seekers by UK government, so that this regrouping – together with other kinds of family reunion – appears set to be the main way by which the Tamil population in the UK will receive newcomers.
Less is known about Tamil movement within the EU than is known about the re-grouping of Somalis. Indeed, there has been little research on the Sri Lanka Tamil population in the UK as a whole since the first part of the 1990s (Daniel and Thangaraj 1995; Siddhisena and White 1999). Nevertheless, preliminary work by Van Hear in 2004-2006 suggests that a substantial movement of Tamils from continental Europe to the UK is under way. The scale of this onward migration is unclear since new arrivals will be recorded as EU nationals rather than as Tamils, but anecdotally, according to Tamil community leaders and some local government workers, it is significant. As might be expected, the new arrivals appear to have settled in areas near to the core areas of Tamil settlement in London such as Tooting, East Ham and Wembley. However there is anecdotal evidence that some are also settling in other parts of London (such as Lewisham), other parts of the southeast (such as Milton Keynes) and the Midlands (such as Birmingham).

As with the Somali European newcomers, European Tamils’ motivations for moving to the UK cluster around economic opportunities, education and language, and the social and cultural environment. Commonly all of these motivations are found in an individual’s or family’s decision to move to the UK.

First, regarding economic opportunities, Tamils interviewed in London who had come from continental Europe said they found it easier to find employment or to set up businesses in the UK than in continental Europe. A particular issue was the greater ease of entering the labour market – both in terms of greater opportunities and fewer obstacles. A national insurance number was relatively easy to obtain, and this is the only form of documentation needed to start working in the low end of the labour market. There also appeared to be more jobs available at this end of the market than in the previous country of residence. The qualifications threshold for entering semi-skilled work also appeared to be lower in the UK than in some other European states. As for the more highly skilled, professional qualifications could be converted more easily in the UK than in some other EU states, because initial qualifications gained in the Sri Lankan educational system were based on the British model. In other words, the much vaunted flexibility of the UK labour market, at the lower
end at least, seemed to be attractive to Tamils who had experienced more
constrained employment conditions in continental Europe.

The experiences of some families recently settled in the UK from
France, the Netherlands and Germany bear out these observations. A
Tamil man who had relocated with his family to the UK from France in
2003 observed wryly that ‘if you are in Europe, you have to get a diploma
in their language to get a job. Otherwise the only possibilities are
restaurants and cleaning. In UK, you can do more jobs without a diploma.
In France a three or five star hotel needs a diploma. I was there many
years: I just got up to salad -- I graduated from washing to cleaning to
salads’. He and his wife also thought that there were many more
opportunities for women to work in the UK, such as domestic work and
cashier jobs in supermarkets or shops.

A young Muslim Tamil who had spent his teenage years in the
Netherlands after his family fled from their home in Jaffna during the
LTTE’s expulsion of Muslims in 1990 had quickly found work in the UK.
There were no jobs in the Netherlands, he said: he went to the UK
because job prospects were better, and chose to settle in East Ham
because he knew some friends there who said he could get work. ‘Some
friends in England told me that it was better than the Netherlands: you
could get better work there’. He worked in car repair in the Netherlands,
and now worked in an exhaust and tyre fitting shop in East Ham.

A Tamil who had settled in Germany in the early wave of refugees
who left Sri Lankan around 1983 and had moved to the UK in 2005 found
work easily as a fruit packer through an employment agency that
recruited Tamils, Somalis and others for a food processing plant in Essex.
He earned around the minimum wage, had applied for tax credit, and
eventually wanted to set up his own restaurant, having worked in that
sector in Germany. The three cases appear to show a fairly typical recent
arrival employment pattern – accepting low paid work initially, while
maintaining the aspiration to something better, particularly setting up a
business.

Education and language were also important factors. The aspiration
to learn English and in particular for children to be educated in English
was another key motivation for moving to the UK. In addition to better
job prospects, the family from France referred to above moved to the UK because the husband wanted the children to learn English. ‘Language is the main reason...English is the priority language in Sri Lanka’. Part of the motivation here was the prospect of return home to Sri Lanka (a forlorn hope since the disintegration of the ceasefire from late 2005). They said that if everything was settled in Sri Lanka, they wanted to go back, and that the children needed to know English for this. While the mother in this family was rather more ambivalent than her husband about moving to and staying in the UK, she accepted this argument. In the case of the Tamil family that had moved from Germany, problems with discipline at school and declining school results of the eldest son were part of the motivation for the move of the family to the UK. The desire for children to be educated in English and for them to experience less isolation at school appeared to be key motivations for movement to the UK.

Finally, the social and cultural environment also played an important role in prompting relocation. Movement to the UK is in large part a reflection of regrouping at the level of the household and family. Some individuals and families that have moved to the UK have been pioneers, with the expectation that others would follow them. Others have re-joined relatives earlier settled in the UK, having been separated in the course of displacement and the process of asylum-seeking. Arguably, such re-grouping might have taken place whatever the location, once the opportunity arose. A further important socio-cultural factor encouraging movement specifically to the UK is the greater critical mass of the Tamil population, which sustains temples, Tamil language classes, Saturday schools, and meets other cultural needs. The contrast with life in continental Europe in this respect is often articulated. For example, the Tamil family formerly living in Germany felt isolated there: ‘We were in Germany alone’. The parents were concerned about racism, particularly its effect on their children. The UK was more attractive because ‘we have more relations and more culture here’. In Germany, Tamils were more spread out than in the UK – so there was less of a critical mass of people that could support cultural activities. Further attractions were the greater presence of Tamil-run advice and welfare organisations in the UK. The family had heard about one such organisation and the possibility of a job
through it while in Germany. Having temples nearby was another factor. In general, ‘there are more opportunities for social activities here [in the UK]’. Similarly, the young Dutch Tamil remarked simply: ‘there are more Tamils and less racism in London’.

While these dimensions – employment and livelihoods, education and language, and social and cultural environment -- are strong pull factors motivating movement from continental Europe to the UK, it would be misleading to present this ‘pull’ as universal and even. As has already come across in some of the above accounts, feelings about moving vary even within households. Spouses often differed in their opinions of the shift, and children likewise missed their friends in the previous country of settlement. Expectations of life in the UK were also sometimes not fulfilled. Thus the wife in the Tamil family that had moved to the UK from France found it lonely in the UK: Crawley where they lived was a very quiet area. She noted glumly that other relatives had lived a long time in France and were surrounded by relatives. She did not have many friends in the UK, only some cousins. She had ‘second thoughts’ and would have liked to go back to France, but her husband wanted them to stay. More generally and tellingly, connections with friends and relatives in the former country of residence (France, Germany and the Netherlands in the cases cited above) were maintained assiduously – perhaps to maintain the possibility of return should things not work out in the UK, though this can also be seen as part of a wider pattern of maintaining connections across the diaspora.

On the other hand, the move sometimes reflected a new-found confidence, coming at least in part from having secure status in the EU. As the Tamil family previously living in France noted: ‘Now we have more confidence. We have gone through a major uprooting once [the displacement in Sri Lanka and the move to Europe], so moving to UK was much easier. You don’t have to register here, just come with passport. To get into school, you just go to school admissions, with a French ID card. Now we are able to make a choice where to be’.

The move to the UK does not seem to mark a break in the maintenance of transnational connections – both with others in the diaspora (in the former country of residence and elsewhere) and those
still in Sri Lanka. The German Tamil referred to above had paid for the marriages of four sisters through his work in Germany and was now looking to do the same for cousins and nieces. Like many others, he had also helped those remaining in Sri Lanka and with the wider Tamil cause through contributions to Tamil organisations in Sri Lanka.

Are these relocations part of a long term strategy or are they a pragmatic response to new opportunities? There is not enough evidence to assess this. One notable feature of the cases investigated so far is the short period of time between securing a passport allowing mobility within the EU, and the actual move to the UK. This suggests perhaps that the idea of such a move is already well established. But the decision could also well be simply shaped by the apparent current general attractiveness of the UK to migrants generally. The most that can be said from current evidence is that among some Tamils living in continental Europe there is a strong impetus to move to the UK because of greater perceived economic opportunities, for reasons of education and language, to re-group with family and friends, and because of the greater critical mass of Tamils in parts of the UK and therefore the greater possibility to lead a familiar life.

Towards a research agenda: key issues

This preliminary review does not allow us to provide a comprehensive profile and explanation of this onward movement, but it does raise some key issues and questions that might form the basis for future research.

First, we would need to know more about the migration patterns involved. What is the geography, demography, socio-economic profile, temporality and scale of the onward movement of new citizens of refugee backgrounds? For example, are the people moving onwards those who are less or more socio-economically established in their country of citizenship? Do people settle permanently or do they subsequently return to their earlier country of residence or country of origin? Do whole families relocate at once or do some family members remain in the country of citizenship while others find employment?

Why do people move in this way? Mainstream migration theories may offer relevant explanations to consider. Neoclassical explanations
conceptualise migration as part of the spatial redistribution of factors of production, reflecting individual responses to income and other differentials between home and host countries (e.g. Todaro 1969). The ‘new economics of labour migration’ focuses on migration as a household-level strategy to diversify income sources to minimise risks (e.g. Stark and Bloom 1985). Other theories emphasises the structure and demand from host countries as an explanatory factor (e.g. Piore 1979). Further theoretical approaches have incorporated social networks and institutions as factors in migration (e.g. Boyd 1989). Any investigation of EU mobility of new citizens will have to explore the possible roles of income and employment patterns; family economic strategies; social networks and institutions and other structural differences between EU countries.

In this paper we have described the movement of new citizens within the EU as onward movement, rather than secondary movement. This is for two main reasons. First, the term secondary movement is simply not accurate for many of the people involved. It implies that the first movement was from the country of origin to Europe, and the second movement was within Europe. Many refugees’ migration history is more complicated, with some people living for a period in other countries before moving to Europe. For some people this is not a second but a third or even fourth stage in their migration.

Second, the term secondary movement is most often used in recent years to describe movement of a distinct geographic type. The term is heavily associated with movement from poor first countries of asylum to richer countries. But the type of movement we are addressing is between richer countries. The much-scrutinised onward movement from countries of first asylum to Europe or North America is often explained by insecure politico-legal status and the very large economic disparities. We must reach for other explanations for the remigration of new citizens within the EU.

Third, the term secondary movement has acquired a negative connotation in policy circles. Given the legal barriers enshrined in the ‘safe third country’ rule and at the EU level, the Dublin Convention, and visa restrictions imposed on refugee nationalities, to enter Europe and claim asylum without using irregular means at some point is very difficult for
people fleeing conflict-affected countries. The term secondary movement is strongly associated with irregular methods of entry used by displaced people in the region of origin to travel to Europe, and by undocumented newcomers, asylum-seekers or rejected asylum-seekers to travel onwards within the EU under the radar of the immigration control. Thus ‘irregular secondary movers’ has taken hold as a rather pejorative term (Sperl 2001). This is in itself problematic, given the reasonable motivations of many of the people involved, but for our purposes the key point here is the distinction between onward movement involving irregular means and the regular free movement of new EU citizens of refugee backgrounds (see also Moret et al. 2005).

These three points - that this can be another movement in a complex mobility chain, that the movement is between rich European countries, and that the mobility of citizens within the EU is entirely regular - need emphasising, because they raise important conceptual issues.

One of the reasons this movement initially surprised some observers is because it appears to complicate the common notion of a ‘refugee cycle’: with displacement followed either by wholesale settlement in a new country or eventual return to the country of origin. It is commonly expected that once refugees gain legal recognition and citizenship in the EU their journey is at an end, or that if they do move again, it will be to return to their country of origin. However, return is not an option for many: in 2004 there were 33 protracted refugee situations around the world (UNHCR 2006). Protracted violence and insecurity in both the Somali regions and Sri Lanka, for example, makes it very difficult for many people to return.

Instead, much emphasis is placed on the process of settlement and socio-economic integration of those who have become citizens in EU countries. These processes of settlement and integration are largely seen to occur at a national level – refugees are expected to settle in France, or in Finland, for example, rather than in the EU. As refugees are commonly seen as traumatised by a dramatic ‘uprooting’, so it is often expected that if they cannot return then the best thing is to be ‘transplanted’ and ‘put down roots’ themselves in a new country (Malkii 1992). Thus, onward movement within the EU in a sense runs counter to expectations in the
refugee literature. Yet, the preliminary evidence suggests that some refugees have, in the course of displacement and onward migration, developed a ‘culture of mobility’ and may be more willing and able than other EU citizens to relocate within the EU.

The onward movement of new citizens of refugee backgrounds is open to a variety of interpretations. For example, do people view their onward movement as a rejection of the country of asylum and an embracing of a second – they hope better – European home? Or do they feel that they are searching for an enclave, seeking to reconstruct aspects of their country of origin overseas wherever they believe will be most accommodating of that? What is the role in all this of national-level immigration and refugee policies, and policies directly aimed at the socio-economic integration of asylum-seekers, refugees and new citizens?

Does this relocation represent a return to older geographies of asylum? It has generally been common for people to seek asylum in European countries that were the largest and richest, and where their country of origin had historical ties – through colonisation, language or earlier labour migration – for example, Germany, France and the UK. However, during the 1990s, as asylum restrictions grew, new geographies of asylum developed such that many countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy, received growing numbers of claims from people with no obvious ties in those countries (Bocker and Havinga 1998). In her study with smuggled asylum-seekers in the Netherlands, Van Liempt (2007) outlines how in the urgency of seeking safety, and given considerable constraints on claiming asylum in the EU, asylum seekers may have no opportunity to decide on a specific destination, or there may be mismatches between their preferences and outcomes. The Dublin Convention tries to ensure that asylum claims are dealt with in the first country in which the claimant arrives in Europe, if not in a safe third country. But is it possible that as refugees become citizens and gain freedom to exercise more choice in where they live, they act according to earlier preferences? For example, do people from Francophone Africa who have become citizens elsewhere in the EU eventually relocate to France or Belgium? If so, to what extent this was an earlier intention or a plan that emerged at a later stage?
Alternatively, do these onward movers see themselves as embracing a regional (European) cosmopolitanism? Is it possible to think of their movement as demonstrating integration within the EU, rather than in specific countries? (Horst 2006b). Perhaps the willingness to move can be seen as evidence of a practical cosmopolitanism, indicating an everyday familiarity with different European cultures as well as that of their country of birth, and/or a deeper cosmopolitan consciousness or world view (Haupt 2007; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). In a legal sense, EU citizenship derives from and complements national citizenship, but the rights of EU citizens only apply when they are outside the Member State of their underlying citizenship, making movement central to the notion of EU citizenship (Guild 2004). How much do new citizens of refugee backgrounds differ from other EU citizens in terms of mobility? Could these new citizens moving onwards within the EU be seen in some ways as model Europeans? The aim of this paper is to open up discussion of these and other questions and to prompt further investigation into a new form of onward migration.

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Michael Collyer, Elspeth Guild, Jill Rutter and David Griffiths for helpful discussions in the course of writing this paper.
### Appendix 1. Estimates of Somali Europeans’ onward migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leaving Denmark</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to community workers, around 1,000 Somalis left Aarhus for the UK in 2001-2005</td>
<td>Jyllandposten 17th March 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali social advisor in Aarhus estimated that 3,000-4,000 Somalis with Danish citizenship have moved to the UK from Aarhus in 2002-2004</td>
<td>Bang Nielson 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leaving the Netherlands</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch government representatives estimate 10,000 to 20,000 Somali Dutch people have moved onwards to the UK</td>
<td>Moret and Van Eck 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An estimated 20,000 Dutch Somalis have left Holland for Britain over the past five years</td>
<td>Evans-Pritchard 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half of Tilburg's 3,000 Somalis have already left, mostly for Leicester.</td>
<td>Evans-Pritchard 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arriving in the UK</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In nine months in 2001-02 over 200 Somali Dutch families arrived in Birmingham, costing the council around £2.6 million in 2000-2001, and an expected £1.8 million in 2001-2002.</td>
<td>Aston 2002; Marsh 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1998 around 18,000 to 22,000 Somalis (mostly Dutch citizens) have moved to the UK from Western Europe and Scandinavia</td>
<td>Momatrade 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000 to 10,000 Somali Dutch nationals live in Leicester. The nine schools in the Highfields district are all at least one quarter Somali.</td>
<td>White 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to a source at Leicester City Council, in May 2001, approximately 20-30 Somali EU nationals were arriving in Leicester per week, although this subsequently decreased</td>
<td>Bang Nielson 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around 9000 Dutch school children of Somali parents arrived in Leicester in the 18 months to January 2002</td>
<td>UK Parliament House of Commons Hansard Debates for 30th Jan 2002 pt26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester government estimates their Somali inhabitants officially at 6,000, but it may be even 10,000, of which 90% are supposed to be Dutch. A British local government official estimated that in total 17,000 Somali Dutch nationals moved to the UK in 1998-2002</td>
<td>Delhaas, 2002 cited in Brons and Schaap 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Endnotes

i Based on information from EU 15.
ii I.e. resident less than five years in another EU-15 Member State.
iii See following sections.
iv See following sections.
vy Moorehead (2006); also Dr Stephanie Riak Akuei personal correspondence with Anna Lindley, 2nd August 2007.
vi Dr Ilse Van Liempt personal correspondence with Anna Lindley, 16th March 2007.
vii Rutter et al. (2007); Dr. Jill Rutter personal communication with Anna Lindley 9th September 2007.
viii Also nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) which includes all EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
ix Note that there are still restrictions imposed on the A8 and Bulgarian and Romanian citizens in many Member States, but this is seen as an interim period. For the UK-specific information www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/applying/eeaeunationals.
x See www.dwp.gov.uk/lifeevent/benefits. Under bilateral social security agreements, access to benefits in the UK may also depend on earlier contributions made by the individual in their previous EEA countries of residence (EC 2005).
xii www.qca.org.uk/qca_7533.aspx
xiii Dutch asylum arrangements have since changed, but many of those who have come to the UK experienced this earlier system.
xiv The commentaries of those involved do often make reference to nomadic culture (Horst 2006a; Lindley 2006; Warfa et al. 2005). But research explaining the geographic mobility of Somali refugees within the UK has stressed similarly concrete factors (Warfa et al. 2005).
xv Pérouse de Montclos (2003) focuses on specific cases of transnational benefit fraud and the movement of asylum-seekers.

References


The migrants who enter the EU are a mixed group composed of asylum seekers and economic migrants. Under CEAS, international protection is granted to those migrants who qualify as refugees due to a well-founded fear of persecution. Subsidiary protection status is granted to those who would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to his/her country of origin. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ensures the correct interpretation and application of asylum law through the adoption of preliminary rulings, infringement proceedings against Member States who fail to comply with obligations laid down in EU asylum law, or actions for annulment when the legality of a provision of EU legislation is challenged. Nowadays, there are two large demographic trends in the European Union (hereinafter EU): continuous population ageing and increasing migration flows (European Commission, 2014), both relevant to study the relation between demography and security though this article only focuses on the second one. The abolition of internal borders within the EU fostered the dissemination of narratives that suggest a security deficit and new challenges to public order derived from the opening of internal borders, leading to increasing politicization and securitization of migration and asylum issues (Huysmans, 20). In principle, a European distribution system for refugees should only apply to the initial acceptance of refugees and should not be linked to a requirement of long-term residency for refugees. It is advisable that, after a specified period of integration, the refugees gain full access to the common European labour market, thereby enjoying the right of freedom to move, just like EU citizens. Member states are not only confronted with a free-riding problem within the borders of the EU, but also with respect to non-member states. It is therefore reasonable for the EU to include important non-member states, for example Turkey, in its efforts to coordinate asylum policy, and also into the system for burden sharing. The European Union has called for a compulsory system across the bloc to manage migration, after years of division over how to respond to a big influx of migrants and refugees. The German-backed pact would require all 27 EU countries to take part. Member states would either agree to take in asylum seekers or take charge of sending back those refused asylum. European Commission head Ursula von der Leyen called it a "European solution to restore citizens' confidence". The recent fires that destroyed the Moria camp in Greece, housing more than 12,500 migrants and refugees, was &