NOT QUITE OVER THE RAINBOW: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING INFLUENCES ON THE 2004 GEORGIA GAY MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

by

ANDREW MOORE

(Under the Direction of M.V. Hood III)

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the root causes and influencing factors involved in legislator voting on the 2004 Georgia gay marriage amendment. Using the characteristics of individual legislators as well as demographics of the districts which they represent, a logit regression analysis determined that the amendment followed the pattern of morality policy theory whereby legislators demonstrate high responsiveness to their constituents on highly salient issues.

INDEX WORDS: Gay marriage, legislative voting, morality policy, logit analysis, Georgia General Assembly.
NOT QUITE OVER THE RAINBOW: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING INFLUENCES ON THE 2004 GEORGIA GAY MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

by

ANDREW MOORE

Bachelor of Arts, University of Georgia, 2006

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2006
NOT QUITE OVER THE RAINBOW: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING
INFLUENCES ON THE 2004 GEORGIA GAY MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

by

ANDREW MOORE

Major Professor: M.V. Hood III
Committee: Charles Bullock
Jamie Carson

Electronic Version Approved:
Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
December 2006
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work first and foremost to my almighty Lord and Savior who has given me both the ability and the determination to see it through. I also dedicate it to my wife Amanda, whose support and empathy throughout the process cannot be overstated, and to my daughter Taylor, whose impending arrival provided the impetus for my work’s completion.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Trey Hood for all of his hard work and assistance in making this project come together. Also, I would like to thank Drs. Charles Bullock and Jamie Carson for their input and time.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. v

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii

SECTION

1  Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
2  Background ..................................................................................................................... 3
3  Literature Review .......................................................................................................... 13
4  Research Question ......................................................................................................... 21
5  Data and Methods .......................................................................................................... 22
6  Hypotheses ...................................................................................................................... 26
7  Findings ........................................................................................................................ 28
8  Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 31

TABLES ........................................................................................................................................ 33

FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................... 38

REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................. 39
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>House Vote 1 on SR 595 by Party</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>House Vote 2 on SR 595 by Party</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>House Vote 1 on SR 595 by Party and Race</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>House Vote 2 on SR 595 by Party and Race</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senate Voting on SR 595 by Party</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Senate Voting on SR 595 by Party and Race</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Logit Models Predicting House Voting to Support SR 595</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Logit Model Predicting Senate Voting to Support SR 595</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Table 1: Effects of District Support for Gay Marriage Constitutional Amendment on Support for First House Vote (SR 595)………………………………………………………………………………………………………………38
Section 1 - Introduction

The 2004 Georgia gay marriage amendment was, and remains, one of the most contentious and controversial issues in recent state history. Brought forward at a time when national debate raged on the issue in the wake of precedent-setting court cases in California and Massachusetts, the sensitive nature of the legislation compounded with pitched and, at times, hysterical rhetoric on both sides of the issue acted to create a maelstrom of religion, sex, race and power rarely seen in modern state politics. From the moment of the amendment’s first proposal until it was adopted by popular vote in the November 2004 election, the legislation captured the public’s attention and was the source of seemingly endless discussion and debate. Everyone in the state, it seemed, had an opinion; middle ground had been effectively evacuated.

Relatively unknown legislators and lobbyists made considerable political hay on the issue, and names such as Mike Crotts, Karla Drenner and Allen Thornell rose from public obscurity to the front page headlines almost overnight. Not only were individual political fortunes made but the debate surrounding the entire episode and the subsequent passage of the amendment also assuredly contributed later that year to creating the first Republican majority in the House since Reconstruction. The entire landscape of state politics convulsed under the pressure created by the amendment, and when it had finished that landscape looked markedly different than before.

Of the many questions raised by the amendment and its surrounding issues, one of the most intriguing concerns the actual voting on the legislation itself. Many new and strange bedfellows became acquainted during the debate surrounding the amendment, a trend which
ultimately manifested itself in voting by individual legislators. Party and racial lines, deep
divisions that had long held firm, buckled under the weight of the public and private outcries
from proponents on both sides of the issue. Therefore, the question arises as to what exactly
determined how individual legislators voted on the issue? Parsing out the factors that did so is
the purpose of this inquiry.

It would be severely reductionist to attempt to pin the entire outcome of a state
constitutional amendment on a single factor, or even on a handful of them. Still, through careful
analysis, it is possible to piece together a probable version of what prompted legislators to act as
they did when voting on the amendment. This study aims to provide insight into the trends which
ultimately made possible the passage of such a contentious piece of legislation through analysis
of each legislator’s vote.
Section 2 - Background

Georgia’s gay marriage debate began on January 26, 2004, with the introduction of Georgia Senate Resolution 595 by State Sen. Mike Crotts (R–Atlanta). The resolution, introduced for the purpose of “Proposing an amendment to the Constitution so as to provide that this state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man and woman; to provide for submission of this amendment for ratification or rejection; and for other purposes,” (Georgia General Assembly 2004a) was immediately referred to the Senate Rules Committee. Upon receiving the legislation, Rules Committee Chairman Don Balfour (R–Snellville) fired an early verbal salvo in the already brewing public dialogue concerning the measure, stating that “Instead of letting judges decide (the issue), we'll let the people decide.” (Associated Press 2004a)

SR 595 passed quickly through committee, moving along to the floor after only two hours of debate on February 10. Crotts addressed the Rules Committee and provided his rationale for proposing the legislation, declaring that, “Because of what other states were doing, and what other judges were ruling in other states, I decided our code was kind of silent on what a judge would do if there's a lawsuit.” (Gross 2004) Brought before the full Senate on February 16, SR 595 narrowly passed by the necessary two-thirds majority required by Georgia law for a constitutional amendment, with a final tally of 40 to 14. The partisan vote breakdown foreshadowed future occurrences as all 30 Senate Republicans were joined by ten rural white Democrats in support of the resolution. (Suggs 2004a)

Debate on the Senate floor turned testy when Crotts, reiterating his rationale concerning the actions of activist judges, engaged State Sen. Nadine Thomas (D-Decatur) in a shouting
match just minutes before the final vote. Thomas argued against altering the fundamental laws of
the state for what she saw as political gain, arguing, “You want to put all your energy into
legislating morality. I am not going to let mean-spirited men and women . . . go and start
dismantling this constitution, because I don't trust you to do it.” (Suggs 2004a)

With SR 595 having cleared the Senate, attention then turned quickly to the State House of
Representatives, where both supporters and opponents of the legislation saw a sharply
contested battle for passage taking shape. Legislators were met with unusually pitched public
debate on the topic, both formal and informal. Rep. Jay Shaw (D-Lakeland) expressed such a
sentiment, stating that "I can't go to church or the grocery store without people saying, 'Please
don't support gay marriage.'" Further, Shaw noted that such an outpouring was impossible to
ignore. "I can't not vote for it," he said. “I've gotten hundreds of e-mails against it. I've gotten one
for it, and it was from Atlanta." Rep. Robert Ray (D-Fort Valley) accurately described the
dilemma facing many rural Democrats when he stated, "Where I live, if I want to come back to
the Legislature, I'd have to vote for that amendment to ban it." (Campos 2004a)

Democrats quickly recognized the potential quandary faced by many members of their
party and party leaders began to consider measures to counteract the constituent pressures being
exerted upon their rank and file. A closed-door meeting of Democratic leadership floated the
idea of counter-proposing a more flexible marriage ban that many of its members would find
more palatable than the Republican version, but this proposal was never realized. Democratic
House Whip Nan Orrock (D-Atlanta) expressed the conflicted position of the party leadership,
commenting on the possible actions of the Democratic caucus, “The jury's out. It's awfully hard
to say. We've got a lot of people on both sides here.” Rep. Mike Snow (D-Chickamauga) put it
more succinctly. "Those of us from rural areas, we'd have to vote for it, and we will," he said. (Wyatt 2004a)

Meanwhile, outside the halls of power, lobbyists and activists on both sides of the issue dug in for a pitched battle. Georgia Equality, the state’s largest gay rights advocacy group, emerged as the prime mover behind the grassroots movement in opposition to the legislation, mobilizing members to contact their legislators by any means possible. Georgia Equality executive director Allen Thornell said, “At its core, this amendment is about homophobia. It is about misunderstanding. It is easy to have stereotypes about individuals, until you really get to know about them.” Thornell himself became, in some sense, one of the faces of the resolution’s opposition, a role which he reluctantly embraced. “I know a person can become the face [of a debate], but all of the press is about the issue,” he said when asked about his public image. (Suggs 2004b)

State Rep. Karla Drenner (D-Avondale Estates) also found herself uniquely positioned to impact the legislation’s journey through the House. A legislator since 2001, Drenner was Georgia’s first openly gay lawmaker, a position that made her uniquely affected among her colleagues by the possible outcome of the resolution. Drenner told the press that, since the marriage debate first began to rage, she had been treated differently by some of her fellow legislators. “They turn their back on you, and they look at you like you're some scourge of God,” Drenner said. “People wouldn't ride elevators with me. But I love them. Even if they wouldn't give me a drink of water if I was thirsty, I love them.” Yet, even within her own party’s caucus, Drenner found her voice being marginalized under an outpouring of public support for the resolution’s passage. (Wyatt 2004b)
Upon reaching the House, many were uncertain whether the bill would even leave the House Rules Committee for a floor vote. Stacked with 23 Democrats out of 30 seats, the Rules committee seemed to be the best hope for opponents seeking a Democratic quashing of the legislation’s momentum. Committee members publicly floated the idea of amending the resolution to add a provision banning adultery as well, but ultimately convened with no set game plan for dealing with the resolution. State Rep. Bob Holmes (D-Atlanta), summed up the atmosphere surrounding the legislation, stating, “In all my years on the Rules Committee, I can't remember anything being this up in the air.” After adjourning once without voting, the Rules Committee moved to bring SR 595 to the House floor by a vote of 23-6. (Suggs and Campos 2004)

Thus, the stage was set for the afternoon of February 26, when, in a surprise move by the House leadership, SR 595 was brought before the Georgia House for vote. Both sides engaged in three and a half hours of pitched and emotional debate, with rhetoric citing sources as diverse as the Bible, Webster’s dictionary, Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the popular gay publication Out. Rep. Bill Hembree (R-Douglasville) spoke for those in favor of the amendment, arguing that, “The institution of marriage has existed for thousands of years and it has always been a commitment between a man and a woman.” Others, such as Rep. Bob Holmes (D-Atlanta) argued against the resolution because of its potentially harmful impact on the Atlanta business community, particularly large corporations headquartered in the city who wished to extend domestic partner benefits to their employees. Rep Larry Walker (D-Perry), a 31-year veteran of the legislature, exemplified the conflicted nature of many involved in the debate. After proposing a failed amendment to narrow the resolution’s scope, he ultimately voted in favor of it. “It's an
issue that's tough, one of the toughest issues in my tenure in this Legislature,” he said. (Tharpe and Suggs 2004)

However impassioned the sides became, though, the day’s most poignant moment belonged to Rep. Drenner. Speaking before a rapt chamber, Drenner equated the proposed amendment to legalized discrimination “based on a hypothetical court case,” and attempted to sway the few undecided legislators through personal plea. “I am who I am,” she said. “I make no apologies about that. I am what God made me. I was not raised to be gay.” Ultimately her message hit home as, following a tense vote made even more dramatic by the chamber’s packed viewing gallery, SR 595 failed to achieve the needed two-thirds of the House membership, although gaining a solid majority of 117 to 50. Several legislators, primarily members of the Legislative Black Caucus, abstained from voting or were excused from the proceedings. (Tharpe and Suggs 2004a)

Reaction to the resolution’s defeat was swift among observers. Cheers rang through a gallery of primarily gay rights supporters, many of whom were organized to attend the day’s proceedings by Georgia Equality. Others, such as Christian Coalition of Georgia chairman Sally Fields, met the result with stoic resolve. Fields had led the charge to pass the resolution, organizing grassroots efforts across the state through the Coalition’s considerable resources. “It was very disappointing that we have people who will stand in the well of the House and say they are for the sanctity of marriage and then vote against it,” said Fields, adding, “I find it very disingenuous when legislators want to have it both ways.” She then vowed to continue working for the legislation’s passage, adding, “It’s not over.” (Jacobs 2004a)

Following the defeat, Republicans made a motion to reconsider the resolution, which passed by a simple majority on March 1 and set the stage for an even more pitched battle the
following week as both sides looked to swing the final outcome in their favor. Lobby efforts focused on eleven of the thirteen representatives counted as having not registered votes. One of the thirteen, Rep. Burke Day (R-Tybee Island), claimed that a malfunctioning voting machine incorrectly registered his yea as a no vote, and House Speaker Terry Coleman would vote only in the event of a tie. Both Georgia Equality and the Christian Coalition of Georgia planned massive rallies for their supporters at the state Capitol. Legislators were swamped by phone calls, letters and emails from proponents on both sides of the debate. Such efforts began to show an effect when Rep. Hugh Floyd (D-Norcross), stated his probable intention to switch his vote to favoring the resolution’s passage due to overwhelming constituent response to his initial vote. “The bottom line is I do not approve of same-sex marriages,” he said. “What I was against was changing the constitution. But everyone thinks I voted [no] because I approve of same-sex marriage. . . . That's kind of got me upset.” (Salzer 2004)

Monday, March 1 saw one of the most impassioned and colorful displays in the long history of the Georgia State Capitol grounds when over 1,500 supporters of the amendment and 500 gay rights demonstrators staged opposing rallies in the hope of influencing the final outcome of SR 595. With news cameras rolling and helicopters circling overhead, a string of ministers and legislators addressed the crowd from a makeshift platform, exhorting the necessity of the resolution’s passage as opponents of the measure chanted slogans from across the street. While the battle raged outside, legislators inside the Capitol voted to reconsider SR 595 by a tally of 127 to 48, a sign many amendment supporters took positively. Additionally, Rep. Glenn Richardson (R-Dallas), an influential member of the Republican caucus, claimed that the resolution’s supporters had amassed the 120 votes necessary to ensure passage. “I believe we have the votes today to pass it if we voted right now,” he told reporters. One such vote belonged
to LaNett Stanley-Turner (D-Atlanta), a member of the Legislative Black Caucus who did not participate in the first vote. “I have no problem voting my conviction. I will vote the way my district thinks is best. I will vote for the ban,” she said. (Tharpe 2004a)

On March 4, House Democrats launched what was perceived as a last ditch effort at defeating SR 595 by introducing a marriage amendment of their own on the grounds that the “convoluted” Republican version was open to legal challenge. Rep. Jeanette Jamieson (D-Toccoa), the new resolution’s sponsor, argued that her bill was less likely to be overturned on a technicality, claiming that “When you lead people to believe they're going to vote on something, then you should make sure it counts.” Not surprisingly, Republicans quickly denounced the attempt as a political ploy, with some going as far as to claim that the intention was to send the resolution into conference with the Senate, where it could be effectively killed. “Voters have to understand that there's going to be a lot of political maneuvering,” said Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (D-Sharpsburg). (Galloway 2004)

Jamieson’s bill met an early setback on March 9, when a vote to engross the resolution, or to protect it from amendments, failed by a large margin. Seen as a litmus test on the Democratic version’s viability, engrossing would have made passage of the new resolution much easier by prohibiting any changes within it. The measure failed by a tally of 104 to 56, a margin reached by an unlikely coalition of Republicans eager to see their own bill pass and liberal Democrats opposed to any such resolution. (Associated Press 2004b) This development made increasingly clear the inevitability of a second vote on the Republican-backed SR 595, though the timetable for such was as yet unknown.

Gay rights advocates had long claimed marriage as a civil right, a belief that often engendered sympathy from African-American legislators hesitant to curtail any civil rights
legislation. However, further fractures within the Democratic caucus began to surface later in March, when a petition began to circulate in African-American churches on which signers claimed that “To equate a lifestyle choice to racism demeans the work of the entire civil rights movement,” stating their opposition to that rationale used by gay rights advocates in courting African-American support. Further, a group of influential African-American clergy publicly stated their support for the resolution’s passage on religious grounds and called for members of the Legislative Black Caucus to follow their lead. Said Rev. William Shields of Hopewell Baptist Church in Norcross, “We must act now before we are reacting.” God ordained family as husband, wife and children. This [gay marriage] will choke the life out of us.” Further illustrating the pressures placed upon the Legislative Black Caucus, the NAACP weighed in opposing the resolution in the form of letters sent out by board member and former Georgia legislator Julian Bond. (Tharpe and Suggs 2004b)

As the legislative session drew closer to an end and the second vote on SR 595 remained in committee, nervous Republicans began chiding Democratic leadership for their “obstructionist” tactics in preventing the measure from reaching the floor again. Four days before the session ended, Rep. Earl Ehrhart (R-Powder Springs) chided House Rules Committee chairman Calvin Smyre (D-Columbus) about the delay. “We have the votes to pass it, and they won't bring it back for a vote,” he said. “What they're doing is just being obstructionists. It's nothing more than an attempt to delay and eventually kill the proposition.” Smyre expressed the difficulty of his position as both House Rules Committee Chair and House Democratic Caucus Chair, as well as a prominent member of the Legislative Black Caucus. “I feel like bookends. I'm being pushed from both sides to either hold it or let it go,” said Smyre on March 24. “At this juncture, I'm not committed one way or another.” (Tharpe 2004b)
Finally, on March 30, the House Rules Committee moved to place a revote on SR 595 on the House agenda. The decision came after a rare appearance by House Speaker Terry Coleman before the Committee asking for a vote on the issue out of respect for rural constituents across the state who hold the resolution in high regard. “It's gonna take some debate,” said Coleman in urging a vote, adding, “I think it would be a mistake to call it up on the last day.” (Wyatt 2004c)

With a vote scheduled, the opposing sides began a final sprint to the finish. For gay rights advocates, that meant calling into question the potential ramifications of the resolution’s passage. “After we defeated it the first time, people really decided to look at what's in the bill,” said Allen Thornell. “They recognized this is not just against marriage but it's against any sort of legal recognition for gay relationships.” For Christian Coalition Chairman Sadie Fields, it meant allaying concerns of the state’s business community. “There's no desire on anybody's part to get into a corporate boardroom and say what they can and cannot do,” she said in a press release. “This is just saying that government will not sanction anything as marriage except a union between a man and a woman.” (Tharpe 2004c)

The second vote on SR 595 finally reached the floor on the afternoon of March 31, and following two more hours of intense the debate the measure passed by a margin of 122 to 52. The final margin of passage for the resolution was provided by four Democratic members of the Legislative Black Caucus, Randal Mangham (D-Decatur), Sharon Beasley-Teague (D-Red Oak), Carl Von Epps (D-LaGrange) and Stanley-Turner, all of whom abstained from the initial vote but cast yea ballots the second time around (Tharpe 2004d). Said Sen. Crotts, the resolution’s initial sponsor, “I think it's a great day for the people of Georgia. Georgia is in a position now that the people will have an opportunity to go to the polls and have their will heard instead of some possible activist judge.” Drenner, for many the face of the gay rights activists who opposed
the resolution, found the day’s proceedings understandably difficult. “I am shocked and devastated,” she said, adding, “In my opinion, nobody won. When we have this much divisiveness, nobody wins.” (Badertscher 2004)

Further divisions within the Democratic caucus also began to surface in the vote’s aftermath, with several questioning the actions of the four African-American legislators who sided with the majority. “Without unity, how do we ever get respect?” asked Rep. Jo Ann McClinton (D-Atlanta). “There appears to be people in the caucus who don’t understand how we got here today and don’t understand the importance of civil rights.” While conservatives claimed a victory for the people of the state, gay rights advocates immediately began planning a response to the development in both the courts and the November popular referendum on the proposed amendment (Badertscher 2004)

Following an unsuccessful court challenge, the amendment banning gay marriage in Georgia went to popular vote on November 2, 2004. One of eleven states with such measures on the ballot, Georgia had one of the largest margins of passage in the nation with over 75 percent of voters in favor of the ban. Despite the defeat, the newly renowned Drenner remained positive. “We are disappointed but we are not defeated,” she said. “While deception won out today, it will not always. Where exclusion and misrepresentation carried this vote, it is only temporary.” However, Christian Coalition Chairman Fields expressed the views of many Georgians when, of the overwhelming popular support for the measure, she said, “I have said all along that the issue crossed all demographics. . . . The voice of reason in Georgia has prevailed.” (Jacobs 2004b)
Section 3 - Literature Review

Understanding the act of legislative voting, and in particular the influence of constituency upon a particular legislator’s decision, is key to any effective analysis of voting on SR 595. Kingdon (1981) examines a number of factors that play into a final voting decision, such as constituency, fellow legislators, party leadership, interest groups and administration. Through extensive interviews with congressmen and others with close access to the process, Kingdon “investigates such matters as their sources of information and vote cues, their decision rules, and the importance of various actors (e.g., constituents, interest groups, administration) in floor votes” (Kingdon 1981, 5). What he finds is that, with fairly consistent regularity, fellow congressmen and constituency provide the strongest pull in influencing the votes of legislators. The influence of constituency is then traced further to the process by which legislators are recruited to run within a district, a process which “brings a congressman with certain attitudes to the House and keeps him there.” Further, he notes that constituency has “a greater impact on high-saliency votes” (Kingdon 1981, 67).

Arnold (1990) also examines influences on the legislative process, paying particular attention to the extent to which citizens are able to exert control over their government. He notes that the role of parties in the American representative system complicates the linkages between legislators and constituents, and that “the central question is not really whether legislators are responsive to citizens, but rather which citizens legislators respond to and under which circumstances responsiveness varies.” Arnold finds that, while legislators typically are most responsive to smaller and more organized interests, they can feel bound by the preferences of
“broader and more inattentive publics . . . when they are asked to decide about an issue for which group costs could become visible and traceable if . . . (they) enacted the wrong policy” (Arnold 1990, 267). Thus, Arnold traces a clear connection between constituent preferences and legislative voting outcomes, at least in the instance where “group costs could become visible and traceable.”

Miller and Stokes (1963) sought to measure the role of constituency influence in congressional roll call behavior along three issue areas: civil rights, social welfare and foreign policy. Using “path-analysis” linkages, they found that correlation between constituency opinion and roll call voting was high on civil rights issues and attributable to perceived constituency preferences, though strong Southern opposition to civil rights legislation likely skewed the results in a positive direction. On social welfare and foreign policy issues, however, such correlations were weak and negative, respectively. They write of their findings, “although the conditions of constituency influence are not equally satisfied, they are met well enough to give the local constituency a measure of control over the actions of its Representatives” (Miller and Stokes 1963, 56).

Erikson (1978) tackles Miller and Stokes’ work, claiming that their results were “severely attenuated by measurement error in the sample-based estimates of constituency opinion.” By instead simulating constituency opinion, a method that he admits is imperfect but claims is more valid than that of the initial study, he claims that “there appears to be more congressional representation of constituency opinion than has previously been realized” (Erikson 1978, 532). Erikson claims that this representation is the result of previously unconsidered factors, such as constituency influence upon legislators’ issue attitudes, as opposed to a simple evaluation of
constituency opinion on the part of legislators. Further, he posits an electoral influence whereby constituents control their legislators’ positions via the ballot.

Collie (1984) compares analyses of legislative behavior from two different perspectives: that of collective behavior and that of the individual legislator. She notes that collective analyses tend to focus primarily on cleavages within voting groups whereas individual studies are centered on the personal beliefs and behaviors of specific legislative actors. Within the discipline of American politics she detects a shift toward emphasizing district representation within models seeking to explain legislative voting, a trend that has caused “the independent impact of party to become less specifiable.” Further, she argues that “constituency influence on individual legislators’ voting decisions may be greatest when the parties, as collectives, define and shape the political agenda in partisan terms” (Collie 1984, 29-30).

Kuklinski and Elling (1977) examine the representational role of legislators as a linkage between representative and constituent. They find that the predictive ability of the representational role of legislators is overt and that this relationship is particularly strong in policy dimensions which constituents find to be particularly salient. They also note that the representational role of influence in predicting legislative behavior is especially strong if there are adequate measures of both constituency and legislative policy positions, as well as other intervening variables such as policy saliency which may interact with these positions.

Certainly the issue of morality policy, defined as “policy (that) regulates social norms or evokes strong moral responses for other reasons,” (Mooney and Lee 1999, 82) plays a critical role in any examination of gay marriage legislation. Gusfield (1986) provides one of the earliest examinations of morality policy, using the example of alcohol prohibition to explain his argument that morality policy disputes are essentially attempts by political actors to have the
government approve one set of values over another. He likens morality politics to distributive politics, with the only difference being that, instead of goods or services, that which is being distributed by the government is moral value.

Mooney and Lee (1995) examined the issue of legislating moral issues, addressing the question of whether or not legislation which evokes a strong moral reaction has a different pattern of adoption from legislation that deals with primarily economic issues while simultaneously testing Lowi’s (1964) assertion that “policy determines politics.” They note the inherent “uncompromising clashes in values” that occur in debates surrounding morality policy issues and also claim that “morality issues tend to be more widely salient and lower in technical complexity than many economically-based issues” (Mooney and Lee 1995, 600). Using abortion regulation legislation from the pre-_*Roe*_ 1960’s and 70’s Mooney and Lee examine adoption patterns across distinct dimensions and find that Lowi’s assertion that “policy determines politics” is correct. They also find that morality policy is driven by factors, specifically public opinion and interest group strength, which have significantly less sway over economic legislation.

Mooney and Lee (1999) add to their previous work with an examination of morality policy reinvention via state death penalty policies. By examining differences in policies as successively adopted by individual states, they were able to determine how diffusion of such legislation occurred and how this diffusion was influenced by the sensitive nature of the policy areas that the legislation addressed. They conclude that morality policy differs significantly in its diffusion in that, instead of the commonly seen incremental progression of policy expansion, morality policy diffusion is punctuated by “major, non-incremental change adopted by initial innovators, followed by the adoption of more moderate policies by later adopters” (Mooney and
Lee 1999, 83). Further, no evidence existed to support the commonly-held notion of systemized learning among policy actors. These differences are attributed to the technical simplicity and high saliency inherent among morality policies.

Mooney and Lee (2000) provide additional insight on the role of public opinion in the shaping of morality policy, investigating the differing effects when a clear public majority exists versus when public sentiment is more closely divided. They note that, “The high public salience and technical simplicity of morality policy provide for perhaps ideal conditions for democratic responsiveness by policy makers” (Mooney and Lee 2000, 225). Further, they hypothesize that “the link between the public’s values and public policy should be even stronger for morality policy than for nonmorality policy.” Examining death penalty reform adoption during both the abolition and reinstatement of the death penalty in the late 20th century, they find that policy actors will closely follow public opinion on a hotly contested, contentious issue. Yet in the event of a one-sided public opinion, the actors will instead turn to elite-level political actors, often party activists, whose viewpoints largely echo public sentiment and who hold a large stake in legislative success for their policy stance.

Haider-Markel and Meier (1996) take the general concepts of morality policy as examined by Mooney and Lee and apply them specifically to the issue of gay rights. They define the core of morality politics theory as holding “that the most important variables in explaining public policy are the distribution of citizen values, the competitiveness of parties and the party affiliations of politicians. In this situation interest groups’ influence will be less important.” They then examine the situations in which gay rights policy would fit this morality politics model as opposed to a more traditional interest group interaction model in which interest groups and political elites act as the primary mover behind policy processes. Following an analysis of state
and local policies enacted to protect the rights of gays, they conclude that, generally speaking, gay political issues follow the interest group interaction model of interest groups working with sympathetic elites. However, they also note that, “when groups that are opposed to gay and lesbian rights are able to expand the scope of the conflict to electoral politics (through initiatives), then the pattern of politics changes to one of traditional morality politics” (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996, 332).

Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002) examine partisan polarization on specific issues, which they term “culture war issues,” such as pornography, gun control and gay rights. Using social survey and congressional roll-call data, they look for patterns of polarization at both the elite and popular levels, as well as attempting to determine either top-down or bottom-up paths of influence on such issues. They note that the function of parties as an intermediary institution on culture war issues is “especially important . . . because many have noted the tendency of culture war issues to polarize the parties. The conflictual nature . . . may gradually lead to long-lasting shifts in the demographic and ideological groups defining party coalitions” (Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002, 91-92). On the issue of gay rights, they find that popular opinion is not directly shaped by elite attitudes and that the potential for issue evolution, a restructuring of parties’ mass coalitions resulting from a particular issue, is strong due to religious-based cleavages in existing electoral coalitions.

Sherrill’s (1996) inquiry into the relative political power of gays portrays attempts at gay political activism as inherently disadvantaged by several barriers to the formation of a political community, as well as a lack of access to traditional resources of political power. One of these barriers is purely demographic; as he notes, “gay people are vastly outnumbered.” Additionally, they are “born into a diaspora,” making any attempt at concentrating their demographic power
difficult and achieving an electoral majority almost impossible. He also notes that the feeling of the American public toward gays is “cold and distant,” with the public according gays widespread and consistently low feeling thermometer scores (Sherrill 1996, 469-470). Such public hostility forces gays to be on the defensive in the political arena, often allowing politicians to demonize them at little or no risk. Because of these barriers, Sherrill argues that there is limited gay political identity and thus no means for gays to exert a sustained political presence.

Werum and Winders (2001) examine the tactics used by both proponents and opponents of gay rights measures and the arenas and levels of government in which these tactics are most effective. They find that both sides of the gay rights debate focus on what they term “classical civil rights issues” dealing with government protection and access, though they go about achieving their goals in markedly different ways. Opponents of gay rights, which they describe as proponents of the status quo, have found repeated success in the form of ballot initiative and other popular measures rather than traditional sources of influence such as access to elite government actors and institutions. Conversely, gay rights advocates are far more successful when using the traditional central government channels of political influence such as judicial activism/litigation and legislative lobbying tactics. They claim that “gay-related activism in the late 20th century is characterized by degrees of insiderness, rather than the classic . . . social movement/countermovement dynamic” (Werum and Winders 2001, 405).

Haider-Markel (2000) assesses the status of gay and lesbian politics in the states, noting that “state governments have increasingly addressed a variety of gay-related issues.” He finds that the tenets of morality politics, or, as he refers to them, “culture war issues,” typically dictate the pattern of politics on state-oriented gay issues such as hate crimes laws, sodomy laws and same-sex marriage. He particularly zeroes in on the marriage issue, stating that it has become a
state issue “perhaps more so than any other gay-related policy.” Laws banning same-sex marriage are thus driven by “party competition, conservative religious groups, the preferences of political elites and Christian Right control of state Republican parties” (Haider-Markel 2000, 291) He notes that, in the absence of any proven method to fight such legislation, gay rights groups typically focus on delaying policy adoption rather than defeating it outright.
**Section 4 - Research Question**

Given this background and the highly contentious nature of the legislative voting on the gay marriage amendment, this study seeks to understand what factors influenced individual legislators to vote for or against passage. In question form, why did specific legislators in the Georgia State House and Senate vote for or against passage of SR 595, and to what degree did the factors affecting their decisions play roles?

This study holds that, given characteristics such as the high saliency of the issue, the low information level needed for popular participation and the emergence of new voting bloc cleavages within existing party structures, the vote on the gay marriage amendment will follow the pattern of morality policy theory. Therefore, evidence of morality policy theory, such as high responsiveness to constituent opinion and the emergence of intense party competition, should be evident in the results of an analysis of the influencing factors.
Section 5 - Data and Methods

For the purposes of testing the factors contributing to a legislator’s vote outcome with regard to the gay marriage ban amendment this study employs logit regression analysis. Logit regression is the most appropriate method due to the binary dependent variable employed in any analysis of legislative voting on a single measure. Thus, the results of this study are to be interpreted not as units of the dependent variable, but in terms of the probability of a legislator voting in favor of the amendment.

In order to best determine which factors influenced voting on the amendment, this study takes into account two primary groups of characteristics as independent variables: those which relate to the individual legislator and those which describe the demographics of the districts being represented. Identifying characteristics of individual legislators include such items as party, race and gender, whereas district demographics include measures of racial composition and the prevalence of same-sex households within the district. The dependent variable of the analysis is the legislator’s actual vote for or against the marriage amendment, coded as 1 for a yea vote and 0 for a nay vote or a did not vote; for the purposes of this study (and for the purposes of those seeking to defeat the amendment) the act of voting nay and not voting are essentially the same in that they show the absence of support for the amendment. This absence is particularly significant given the high institutional barriers confronting any attempt at a constitutional amendment, which require positive votes from two thirds of all members in both the House and Senate.
Data relating to legislation characteristics were collected primarily from legislator biographies on the Georgia General Assembly Website (Georgia General Assembly 2004b). From this source came data to determine a legislator’s party, race and gender, as well as legislature-specific information including whether a legislator came from a multi-member district, served as a committee chair in the House or Senate or served as a member of his respective chamber’s leadership (party leader, caucus chair, whip or floor leader, as well as non-partisan positions such as Senate President Pro Tempore and House Speaker), either majority or minority. Party was selected as an independent variable due to its central nature in all legislative politics and the difference in vote totals across party lines (See Tables 1, 2 and 5), as well as the fact that previous morality policy studies have pointed to party as a vehicle for facilitating the passage of such policy. Race was selected for the crucial role that it plays in determining governing coalitions within the legislature and because of the obvious discrepancy in voting outcomes on the amendment between white Democrats and black Democrats (See Tables 3, 4 and 6). Gender, a less obvious dependent variable, was chosen in response to research that suggests a gender gap in political tolerance of “outgroups” such as homosexuals (Golebiowska 1999).

Measures relating to legislative roles such as district type, committee chairmanship or caucus leadership serve to control for factors emanating from the inherent structure of the legislative process; for example, House Speaker Terry Coleman did not record a vote due to his role as speaker despite his acknowledged support for the amendment. Those legislators representing multi-member districts may be less inclined to vote in favor of the resolution because of the diversity of their drastically larger constituencies, whereas committee chairmen and those in leadership positions may be less inclined to offer support in order to protect their
own positions within the party. All variables used to measure legislator characteristics are binary and coded as follows: for party, 1 if Democrat, 0 if other; for race, 1 if minority (African-American or Hispanic), 0 if other; for gender, 1 if female, 0 if male; for district type, 1 if multi-member, 0 if single-member; for committee chairmanship, 1 if a committee chair, 0 if not; and for caucus leadership, 1 if a party leader, 0 if not.

Independent variables describing district demographics are critical to this examination given the high saliency and legislative responsiveness that one would theoretically expect to see in a scenario involving morality policy. Thus, it is critical to determine to what degree legislators are representing their districts through their votes on the amendment. The percentage of blacks registered to vote within a district was included as a measure of black electoral influence, a factor that must be examined given the disparity in voting between white and black legislators. Black registration data was obtained from the Georgia Legislative Redistricting Office. Another variable, percentage of the district voting in support of the amendment, required only minor manipulation in that individual precinct vote totals had to be aggregated into district-wide totals. While there maybe an endogeneity problem due to the temporal discrepancy inherent in this measure (so far as the popular vote was taken months after legislators voted), this measure is still the best available for gauging opinion within individual districts regarding the amendment itself.¹

The two other district demographic variables, percentage of same sex households within a district and the percentage of evangelicals within a district, required slightly more manipulation due to the fact that these data were only available at the county level. To remedy this, a table of district breakdowns by county was created that listed the percentage of each county’s population located within a given district. These percentages were then multiplied by the data figures for

¹ It can be further argued that while the popular vote on the amendment occurred after the legislative vote, concerns over endogeneity in this situation are somewhat mitigated by the salient nature and visibility of this issue, producing a situation where the probability of legislative influence regarding constituency voting is very low.
each county regarding same sex households and evangelicals, with the resulting totals aggregated by district and then divided by total district population to determine a percentage. Same-sex household data was obtained from the 2000 US Census and evangelical population data was compiled by the Glenmary Research Center (Jones 2002). While inexact in that it assumes a perfect distribution of both same sex households and evangelicals within each county, this method provides the best estimator by district of the two measures given the data available. The percentage of same sex households within a district was included to gauge the effect of these households’ presence within a district on a legislator’s vote as they are most likely to be directly affected by the amendment’s outcome. The percentage of evangelicals within a district was included due to the active role that evangelicals took in supporting and ensuring passage of the amendment through lobbying, rallies and other means of political influence and was intended to gauge the effect of the presence of a strong evangelical community among a legislator’s constituency. All district demographic variables are represented as percentages and are thus interval-level variables.

Separate logit regressions were run for each House vote on the amendment and for the single Senate vote on the amendment. However, for the Senate vote, legislator race and party affiliation were perfect predictors of the vote on SR 595. Thus, only district demographic variables were used in analysis of the Senate vote.
Section 6 - Hypotheses

H1: If a legislator represents a district which strongly supported passage of the gay marriage amendment, that legislator would be more likely to support passage.

H2: If a legislator represents a district with a high concentration of same-sex households, that legislator would be less likely to support the amendment.

H3: If a legislator represents a district with a high concentration of evangelicals, that legislator would be more likely to support the amendment.

H4: If a legislator represents a district with a high concentration of African-Americans, that legislator would be less likely to support the amendment.

H5: If a legislator is a Democrat, he has a lower chance of supporting the amendment.

H6: If a legislator is African-American, he has a lower chance of supporting the amendment.

H7: If a legislator is female, she has a lower chance of supporting the amendment.
H8: If a legislator holds a leadership position, he has a lower chance of supporting the amendment.

H9: If a legislator holds a committee chairmanship, he has a lower chance of supporting the amendment.

H10: If a legislator represents a multi-member district, he has a lower chance of supporting the amendment.
Section 7 - Findings

The results (See Tables 7 and 8) of the logit analyses of voting for SR 595 provide clear support for the morality policy model explaining voting behavior on the amendment. The effect of district opinion, represented by the percentage of a district voting in favor of the amendment, is positive and significant at the .01 level in both House vote analyses and at the .1 level in the Senate analysis. This provides strong evidence for the assertion that legislators voted to reflect the opinions of their constituents on the amendment. The percentage of blacks registered to vote by district was also significant in all analyses and signed in the expected direction.

Of the individual legislator characteristics used in the House analyses, party was by far the strongest predictor. Significant at the .01 level in both analyses and bearing the predicted negative sign, indicating that Democrats were less likely to vote for passage, this provides evidence for voting divisions along party lines. While legislator race had the predicted negative sign indicating that African-Americans were less likely to vote for passage, it was significant at the .01 level only in the first House vote analysis, a result likely owing to the changed votes of several members of the Legislative Black Caucus during the second ballot. Gender had the predicted negative sign indicating that females were less likely to vote for passage, though it was not statistically significant.

Surprisingly, the percentage of same sex households and the percentage of evangelicals bore the opposite signs from the hypothesized direction, though neither variable was statistically significant. This apparent contradiction could owe to the relatively uniform presence of evangelicals across the state and the consistently low numbers of same sex households regardless
of district. Additionally, while leadership position and district type were statistically insignificant as predicted, the control for committee chairmanship was significant in both House analyses (at the .05 level for vote one and the .1 level for vote two). The variable bore a positive sign indicating that being a House committee chairman increased the likelihood of one voting for the amendment’s passage, a result made even more intriguing by the fact that all committee chairs were Democrats. One can thus deduce that prominent Democratic legislators were more likely to support the amendment than the party’s rank and file.

Despite the fact that two of the constituency variables were not related to voting for the amendment, the results concerning party, race and particularly district voting on passage of the amendment provide ample support for an explanation of the amendment’s passage via morality policy. Legislators were responsive to a highly opinionated electorate regarding the issue, while at the same time traditional party structures became proxies for the opposing sides of the debate. Ultimately party lines blurred to the point where passage of the amendment became possible despite the opposition of a large portion of the majority Democratic Party.

A set of predicted probabilities were produced for three of the variables, legislator race and party and support for the amendment, in order to demonstrate their relationship with the first vote for SR 595 in the House.² For example, with all other variables held at their mean or modal values, the predicted probability of a House Republican supporting the amendment was 0.98, compared with 0.77 for Democrats, a significant difference of 0.21. The difference was even more dramatic when accounting for race; the predicted probability of a white legislator supporting the amendment was 0.77, compared with 0.23 for minority legislators. The probability difference of 0.55 was also significant.

² Estimated probabilities were calculated using Clarify 2.1 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).
The district opinion variable provides a more detailed demonstration of an independent variable’s effect on the probability of support due to its continuous nature, an effect that can be seen in Figure 1. With all other variables held at their mean or modal values, as the percentage of district support for the amendment rises from 35 percent to 90 percent, a range that approximates the actual range of district support levels found in voting returns, the predicted probability of a legislator’s support for the amendment increases from 0.008 to 0.98. Again, the probability difference of 0.98 between high and low constituent support is statistically significant. This dramatic result, along with those of the party and race variables (all statistically significant measures at the 0.05 level) provide further support for these variables’ strong role in influencing legislators’ votes on the marriage amendment.
Section 8 - Conclusions

The purpose of this inquiry was to determine and analyze the factors influencing legislators’ voting on the gay marriage amendment, and to that end it has been successful. Using a logit regression analysis, a number of variables concerning characteristics of both individual legislators and their districts as a whole were considered, with the eventual finding that district opinion, party and race played key roles in affecting votes on the amendment. Further, voting influences, party roles and shifting coalitions (particularly the defection of members of the Legislative Black Caucus) involved in the passage of the amendment conform nicely to the morality policy theory of governmental action whereby highly salient “culture war” issues, of which gay marriage is perhaps the most visible, are processed differently by the voting public and handled differently when debated and acted upon in the halls of power. Georgia’s gay marriage amendment was perceived by its proponents to be a morality issue, and the subsequent behavior of the electorate and legislature substantiates their claims.

Though this analysis only encompasses one issue in one state, its principles may be applied to any state ballot initiative involving issues on which morality policy comes into play, such as abortion, gun control and drug policy. As demonstrated in the examined case, the overwhelming support of the state’s citizens for the amendment was too much of an overriding factor, in terms of both the referendum and in influencing legislators’ voting, for opposition of a state constitutional amendment to overcome. Further, the amendment was opposed by a bare majority of the House’s majority party, yet a new coalition of Republicans, white rural Democrats and a handful of socially conservative African-American Democrats emerged to
reach the two-thirds majority needed for the amendment’s passage. Such an occurrence is a hallmark of morality policy theory, and those hoping to act upon future morality issues would do well to examine the results from Georgia’s gay marriage amendment debate and passage to observe a textbook example of morality policy theory in practice.
## Tables

### Table 1. House Vote 1 on SR 595 by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. House Vote 2 on SR 595 by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. House Vote 1 on SR 595 by Party and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Democrat</th>
<th>Minority Democrat</th>
<th>White Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>63.8% (44)</td>
<td>5.3% (2)</td>
<td>97.3% (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>33.3% (23)</td>
<td>71.0% (27)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>2.9% (2)</td>
<td>23.7% (9)</td>
<td>2.7% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. House Vote 2 on SR 595 by Party and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Democrat</th>
<th>Minority Democrat</th>
<th>White Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>63.8% (44)</td>
<td>15.8% (6)</td>
<td>98.6% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>27.5% (19)</td>
<td>81.6% (31)</td>
<td>1.4% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>8.7% (6)</td>
<td>2.6% (1)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Senate Voting on SR 595 by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Senate Voting on SR 595 by Party and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Democrat</th>
<th>Minority Democrat</th>
<th>White Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. Logit Models Predicting House Voting to Support SR 595

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>House Vote 1</th>
<th>House Vote 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-9.4287**</td>
<td>-6.0129*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.0722)</td>
<td>(3.4734)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>-2.9216***</td>
<td>-1.0834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.1897)</td>
<td>(0.9341)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-3.3851***</td>
<td>-3.2708***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.4131)</td>
<td>(1.3949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Position</td>
<td>-1.2538</td>
<td>0.6328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.2684)</td>
<td>(1.6825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair</td>
<td>2.7331**</td>
<td>1.3808*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.1554)</td>
<td>(0.8206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-member district</td>
<td>-0.4147</td>
<td>0.0728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8739)</td>
<td>(0.7578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-1.3573</td>
<td>-0.7636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8262)</td>
<td>(0.7522)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black Registered</td>
<td>-7.1255*</td>
<td>-7.6276**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.6723)</td>
<td>(3.3080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Same Sex Households</td>
<td>31.4106</td>
<td>-16.8977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(94.6453)</td>
<td>(84.5823)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Evangelical</td>
<td>-7.8489</td>
<td>-2.6442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.4542)</td>
<td>(5.7489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Supporting Amendment</td>
<td>23.8508***</td>
<td>17.6754***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.7118)</td>
<td>(5.4257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. *p<.10 (two-tailed test); **p<.05 (two-tailed test); ***p<.01 (two-tailed test)
Table 8. Logit Models Predicting Senate Voting to Support SR 595

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Senate Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.9120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.5092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black Registered</td>
<td>-18.5406***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.4597)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Same Sex Households</td>
<td>-150.0803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(320.2268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Evangelical</td>
<td>-19.6019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18.0464)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Supporting Amendment</td>
<td>25.1784*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.8881)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R² 0.72

N 56

Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<.10 (two-tailed test); **p<.05 (two-tailed test); ***p<.01 (two-tailed test)
Figures

Figure 1. Effects of District Support for Gay Marriage Constitutional Amendment on Support for First House Vote (SR 595)
References


Also known as "Somewhere Over the Rainbow," the 1939 classic and Academy Award winning song from "Wizard of Oz." In 2001, the National Endowment of the Arts and the Recording Industry Association of America named the song the 20th century top song (Bing Crosby's "White Christmas" came second). Listen to our songs. The song has multiple covers, one even annotated on this very site; Israel Kamakawiwo'ole's 1993 "Somewhere Over The Rainbow/What A Wonderful World." Is it in the public domain? Unfortunately, it's not. Depending on how you interpret copyright laws, it could enter public domain in 2034 at the earliest, which is 95 years after the song's original publication. Alternately, because the copyright was renewed in 1979, it might not enter public domain until 2056. "Over The Rainbow" lyrics. Ella Fitzgerald Lyrics. "Over The Rainbow". When all the world is a hopless jumble, and the raindrops tumble all around, heaven opens a magic lane. When all the clouds darken up the skyway, There's a rainbow highway to be found, Leading from your window pane. To a place behind the sun, Just a step beyond the rain. Somewhere over the rainbow, way up high, There's a land that I heard of, Once in a lullabye. Somewhere over the rainbow, skies are blue, And the dreams that you dare to dream, Really do come true. Someday I'll wish upon a "Over the Rainbow" is a ballad composed by Harold Arlen with lyrics by Yip Harburg. It was written for the 1939 film The Wizard of Oz and was sung by actress Judy Garland in her starring role as Dorothy Gale. It won the Academy Award for Best Original Song and became Garland's signature song. About five minutes into the film, Dorothy sings the song after failing to get Aunt Em, Uncle Henry, and the farmhands to listen to her story of an unpleasant incident involving her dog, Toto, and the town.